This study attempts a systematic philosophical examination of C. G. Jung's understanding of the unconscious and, more particularly, of his understanding of das Selbst . Chapter 1 brings into focus the historical context of Jung's discussion by briefly examining the understanding of the unconscious in the work of four leading figures in late 19th century psychology: Wilhelm Wundt, Pierre Janet, Theodore Flournoy, and Sigmund Freud. Chapters 2 through 5 trace the development of Jung's thinking on the nature of the unconscious (...) and on the self; a close textual analysis is made of his writings from the earliest lectures, the Zofingia lectures , to his last major work, Mysterium Conjunctionis . ;Under philosophical scrutiny, Jung's theoretical positions are revealed to be somewhat inconsistent or simply inadequate. Jung does not offer to philosophy a rigorous, carefully worked out theoretical reflection on the nature and structure of the human being. Yet, this said, it is also true that Jung does have something to say on this issue, and it is the effort of this study to give theoretical coherence to Jung's reflections. ;Thus, as re-constructed, Jung's position may be stated as follows: The unconscious is an intelligent, transpersonal structure irreducible to consciousness. As an intelligent structure, the unconscious maintains identity-in-difference, and for this reason, Jung suggests, unconscious intellectual processes are irreducible to conscious intellectual processes which "discriminate." The supra-intelligent, transpersonal unconscious structure is a subject; the self is the supra-intelligent, transpersonal unconscious subject. While the self, the unconscious subject, is irreducible to the conscious subject , the conscious subject remains, nevertheless, a manifestation of the self. The ego and the self are mutually dependent or cor-related. ;In the conclusion of this study, I turn to the thought of Martin Heidegger to help elucidate the concerns of Jung in a more rigorously philosophical manner. (shrink)

This innovative study of ethics in Meiji Japan (1868–1912) explores the intense struggle to define a common morality for the emerging nation-state. In the Social Darwinist atmosphere of the time, the Japanese state sought to quell uprisings and overcome social disruptions so as to produce national unity and defend its sovereignty against Western encroachment. Morality became a crucial means to attain these aims. Moral prescriptions for re-ordering the population came from all segments of society, including Buddhist, Christian, and Confucian apologists; (...) literary figures and artists; advocates of natural rights; anarchists; and women defending nontraditional gender roles. Each envisioned a unity grounded in its own moral perspective. It was in this tumultuous atmosphere that the academic discipline of ethics (rinrigaku) emerged—not as a value-neutral, objective form of inquiry as its practitioners claimed, but a state-sponsored program with its own agenda. After examining the broad moral space of "civilization," Richard Reitan turns to the dominant moral theories of early Meiji and the underlying epistemology that shaped and authorized them. He considers the fluidity of moral subjectivity (the constantly shifting nature of norms to which we are subject and how we apprehend, resist, or practice them) by juxtaposing rinrigaku texts with moral writings by religious apologists. By the beginning of the 1890s, moral philosophers in Japan were moving away from the empiricism and utilitarianism of the prior decade and beginning to place "spirit" at the center of ethical inquiry. This shift is explored through the works of two thinkers, Inoue Tetsujiro (1856–1944) and Nakashima Rikizo (1858–1918), the first chair of ethics at Tokyo Imperial University. Finally, Reitan takes a detailed look at the national morality movement (kokumin dotoku) and its close association with the state before concluding with an outline of some conceptual linkages between the Meiji and later periods. With its highly original thesis, clear and sound methodology, and fluid prose, Making a Moral Society will be welcomed by scholars and students of both Japanese intellectual history and ethics in general. (shrink)

Like most EM physicians presented with a wide assortment of patients I've never seen before, will probably never see again, and cannot schedule for a more convenient return visit when there are not three ambulances pulling up to the door, I sometimes get a bit cranky when I interview a patient who has registered for a less‐than‐valid “emergency.” As a resident in Mel Konner's Becoming a Doctor put it, “Low back pain? Low fucking back pain? You're waking me up for (...) low fucking back pain?” Although I ceased a long time ago to ask, “Why now?”—you almost never get an answer that is satisfying—I still think it. Often, I am sad to say. Perhaps it is a result of the obvious forces of callousness born of distance born of training and of stress. Again, Konner captures it well: “It is obvious … that the stress of clinical training alienates the doctor from the patient, that in a real sense the patient becomes the enemy. … At first I believed that this was an inadvertent and unfortunate concomitant of medical training, but I now think that it is intrinsic. Not only stress and sleeplessness but the sense of the patient as the cause of one's distress contributes to the doctor's detachment.” Such detachment can blinker our eyes from seeing why patients come to the emergency room and prevent our ears from hearing. (shrink)

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that hospital attorneys, risk managers, and other advocates despite the immense contribution which they may make to the process and deliberations of ethics committees—have a unique role in the bioethical decision-making process, but one that neither requires nor precludes membership on such committees. This is not to deny in any way appropriate access to committees or their deliberations by such advocates. Indeed, we would argue strongly that hospital attorneys and risk managers, where there (...) are reasons for including them in committee discussions, should be invited as consultants and participant-observers. Furthermore, we concur wit Gibson, who suggests that hospital attorneys have a teaching role which enhances the committee's understanding of relevant legal issues, cases, and decisions. this is especially true in individual case consultation. Ethics committees and institutional advocates both have important roles within health care institutions, but patients and hospitals are best served when these two agents collaborate without weakening or undermining their mutually distinct functions and priorities. This conclusion is based primarily on the widely acknowledged concern about conflict of interest as well as the more peripheral concern about loss of attorney/client privilege. However, we would argue that in all aspects of committee work, including self-education, policymaking and case review and consultation, these specialists in health law may often give expert advice and counsel to persons regarding a vast arrays of subjects. These include but are hardly limited to the following: Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care, Living Will Legislation, Malpractice Law, Orders Not to Resuscitate, Forgoing Life-Sustaining Treatment, Withholding Nutrition and Hydration, Treatment for Incompetent Patients, Proportionate vs. Disproportionate Treatment, and Suicide and the Law. HECs need to know how attorneys think and especially how hospital attorneys frame bioethical issues, just as they need to know how physicians and nurses think and respond. Even if hospital attorneys are not formally seated on HECs, they should participate in charting the currents in bioethics. Gibson feels that we need to re-examine the roles of the hospital attorney. Perhaps these advocates should be encouraged to wear more than just one “hat,” and for the rest of us to generalize about institutional advocates is both premature and prejudicial. When we stereotype attorneys with a generic label such as “institutional advocates,” we open ourselves to the dangers of an even narrower kind of “reflex advocacy” (11).To achieve open and honest dialogue, all voices and viewpoints must be heard. HECs that arbitrarily and totally exclude hospital attorneys from participation may exhibit the very close-mindedness they are seeking to eliminate. Yet this situation is at its core a paradoxical one: We cannot proscribe the advocate's role without constraining his or her effectiveness. Yet for the sake of their effectiveness we need to protect them from conflict-of-interest situations. Moreover, we also need to be certain that all points of view, including those that derive from the law, are given an adequate hearing by HECs. (shrink)

An increasing number of people seek medical attention for mild cognitive symptoms at older age, worried that they might develop Alzheimer’s disease. Some clinical practice guidelines suggest offering biomarker testing in such cases, using a brain scan or a lumbar puncture, to improve diagnostic certainty about Alzheimer’s disease and enable an earlier diagnosis. Critics, on the other hand, point out that there is no effective Alzheimer treatment available and argue that biomarker tests lack clinical validity. The debate on the ethical (...) desirability of biomarker testing is currently polarized; advocates and opponents tend to focus on their own line of arguments. In this paper, we show how the method of reflective equilibrium can be used to systematically weigh the relevant arguments on both sides of the debate to decide whether to offer Alzheimer biomarker testing. In the tradition of RE, we reflect upon these arguments in light of their coherence with other argumentative elements, including relevant facts, ethical principles, and theories on societal ideals or relevant concepts, such as autonomy. Our stance in the debate therefore rests upon previously set out in-depth arguments and reflects a wide societal perspective. (shrink)

Different ethical frameworks have been proposed as appropriate for integrating into crisis management strategies. This study examines an ethic of care approach to crisis management analysing the case of Northern Rock bank which was at the centre of the recent financial crisis in the UK. The development and maintenance of relationships is fundamental to an ethic of care approach and the research recognises this by examining the bank–stakeholder relationship both before and after the crisis. Considerable anger was directed at the (...) bank post-crisis and, subsequently, the management team resigned. An important contention is that because an ethic of care approach had not been followed external parties judged that management should have foreseen the crisis and the harm caused was deemed intentional, even though predicting the crisis would have been difficult and it is improbable any harm was intended. Additionally, this negative reaction was heightened due to three facets of Northern Rock’s history: (i) its previous existence as a building society, (ii) the ‘local’ nature of the bank and (iii) the creation of The Northern Rock Foundation. These historical factors caused local stakeholders to presume a ‘caring’ relationship between themselves, and the bank had continued to exist post-demutualisation. The events of the crisis compelled stakeholders to re-appraise this presumption, amplifying the post-crisis anger. (shrink)

Suppose there are two people having a moral disagreement about, say, abortion. They argue in a familiar way about whether fetuses have rights, whether a woman’s right to autonomy over her body overrides the fetus’s welfare, and so on. But then suppose one of the people says “Oh, it’s all just a matter of opinion; there’s no objective fact about whether fetuses have rights. When we say that something is morally forbidden, all we’re really doing is expressing our disapproval of (...) it.” The other person protests: “No!—that’s totally wrong. Of course there are objective moral truths.” And suppose their dispute now settles on this new matter of whether there are objective moral facts, and the debate continues. They’ve now stopped discussing abortion, and are discussing the nature of any moral debate about abortion; they’ve stopped doing ethics, and started doing metaethics. If wondering about what one morally ought to do is to engage in ethical thought, then wondering about what one is doing when one wonders about what one morally ought to do is to engage in metaethical thought. When we make public moral judgments are we stating facts, or are we just expressing our opinions? And if there are moral facts, then what kind of fact are they? Can moral judgments be true or false? Can moral judgments be justified, and if so how? These kinds of questions are the domain of metaethics. (I’m not saying that there is a crisp and principled line to be drawn between meta-ethics and regular ethical discourse; but it is, if nothing else, a pedagogically useful division of labor.). (shrink)

In this final lecture, I used instructions coming from the outside as well as rhetorical philosophy up to the achievements of the United States in the way, cited the following as high as 20 U.S. I think that the achievements in philosophy, this 20 achievements are as follows: 1. Re- definition of hermeneutics, resulting in a "philosophical hermeneutics" . understand the concern of the moment rather than the ability to explain the object. 3 allows us to explain thus an awareness (...) event. 4 to become a historical understanding of events . 5 from the hermeneutic methodology In order to understand the events into ontology. 6 to understand a sight change and self-understanding of the event. 7 principles of change as history, literature and art. 8 offers a new aesthetic and poetics. 9 provides a way to deal with representational and abstract art of art. 10 and then regardless of the art real management problem. 11 reaffirmed the non-scientific literature and hermeneutics in true sense. 12 In order to read the classical works of the original to provide a new treatment. 13 new associate with the traditional relationship. 14 the art of interpretation be linked to a reading process. 15 In order to have affected the critical nursing science, history, sociology, etc. methods. 16 criticism of the limitations of the natural scientific thinking. 17 critique of modernity . 18 provides a large amount of pull on the Park map , Hegel and Heidegger books. 19 He described the dialogue by way of consultations In order to understand the contribution. 20. Tree up hermeneutics of tradition and openness to other cultures of the ancient model. With this eight p.m. description of achievements, but also showing a structure of these nine days the future of speech. In this final lecture I take an approach from the outside and ask what Gadamer has achieved in philosophy, then list twenty of what I see as his philosophical accomplishments. These achievements are as follows: 1. Redefines hermeneutics, creating a "philosophical hermeneutics." 2. Focuses on the moment of uptake instead of the object of interpretation. 3. Makes us aware of interpretation as an event. 4. Makes the event of understanding an historical event. 5. Changes hermeneutics from a methodology to an ontology of the event of understanding. 6. Makes understanding an event of transformation of horizon and self-understanding. 7. Transforms history, literature and art as disciplines. 8. Offers a new aesthetics and a new poetics. 9. Offers a view of art that is able to deal with representation and nonrepresentational art. 10. Reintroduces the question of truth in art. 11. Revalidates literature and humanities as true in a nonscientific sense. 12. Offers a new rationale for reading the classics. 13. Forges a new relationship to tradition . 14. Relates interpretation of art to the reading process. 15. Offers a critique of method that has influenced nursing, history, sociology, etc. 16. Offers a critique of the limits of scientific thinking. 17. Offers a critique of modernity. 18. Offers major books on Plato, Hegel, and Heidegger. 19. In describing dialogue in understanding, he contributes to understanding negotiation. 20. Sets an example of hermeneutical openness to tradition, antiquity, and other cultures. The framework of these lectures during these nine day is presented through accounting for the twenty achievements. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Madness, Reason, and PrideRichard G.T. Gipps, PhD (bio)MadnessQuestions such as “what’s madness?” or “what’s reason?” carry no singular sense about with them wherever they go—which isn’t to say that, asked out of a particular interest in a particular context, they can’t be perfectly intelligible. Garson (2023) is wise to this when he follows “what is madness?” with “as opposed to what?”, even if this latter question itself hardly enjoys (...) a clear sense in the initial context of his asking. What counts as a satisfactory answer to “what’s x?” varies, so that sometimes we’ll be satisfied with a name, at other times by information about something’s genus, origin, function, or composition. Things get notoriously tricky when in the philosophical context the question is asked with a presumption of intelligibility despite ‘x’ being, say, an abstract noun formed from an adjective (‘consciousness’ out of ‘conscious’; ‘happiness’ out of ‘happy’; ‘madness’ out of ‘mad,’ etc.). For “what is?” questions are typically most perspicuously mooted when what’s being pursued are enquiries into (what we might call) the ‘essential nature’ of (what philosophers used to call) ‘substances’ or (of what are more ordinarily called) types of ‘thing’ or ‘entity.’ Invoke, by taking one’s lead from the fact that an ‘x’ is grammatically speaking a substantive, the specter of substance, and you can endlessly baffle yourself by now pondering the mysteries of the putative thing. (Vide discussions of “the nature of consciousness.”) Hence the boon of instead pursuing questions of an ‘opposed to what?’ sort; hence Wittgenstein considering using the Earl of Kent’s “I’ll teach you differences” (King Lear) as a motto for his Investigations. Rather more reflective wisdom regarding ‘x’ may thus be gained when we learn to contrast it with ‘y’ and ‘z’ than when peering into x’s non-existent constitution or groping for its never-instituted genus.Later, I make the case that Garson’s conception of reason itself might suffer from a form of substantialization and that, if I’m right in this, troubling implications follow for his approach to madness. But let’s begin by considering his enquiry into the relation of madness, idiocy and reason. So perhaps we’re reflecting on matters legal, and considering—since we’d hitherto been inclined to take ‘reason’ as univocal—what justifies our different treatments of the insane, the intellectually subnormal, and the normal. Or perhaps—proceeding from the same inclination—we’re puzzled by how someone may boast an exceptional IQ or demonstrate marvelous formal rationality (i.e., make deductions of a sort which would please the logician if no-one else) and yet still be quite mad. And then we realize that at which Garson’s Late Moderns seem to have been gesturing: The lack of reason qua intelligence in idiocy is a different [End Page 307] species from the lack of reason qua sanity in madness. An amethyst is lifeless in a different manner than an expired possum (it was never living, never moribund); the arational lack reason in a different sense than do the irrational (and a baobab cannot jump to conclusions.) There is, say his Late Modern theorists, something ‘perverse’ rather than simply deficient about the irrationality of madness.Now an important part of Garson’s thesis has it that “idiocy is a better candidate for the opposite of reason than madness.” One of the reasons for his making this claim is that he follows his Late Moderns in claiming that madness has reason somehow alive within it, albeit in an unconventional or surprising form. I return to his own explication of this below. Consider first, though, the different thought-referencing descriptions under which the speech acts of the thought-disordered, the speech-disordered, the delusional, and the learning disabled subject may be brought. The sufferer of speech disorder has difficulty with fluency or sound production, but once we get used to this we can find our way to the bona fide rational thought immanent within their discourse. The speech acts of the intellectually impaired subject aren’t chaotic, but instead want for invention and richness; they fail to express... (shrink)

Ethics and the Clinical Encounter explores the moral dimensions of clinical medicine and the phenomenon of illness, to determine what ethics must be in order to be fully responsive to clinical encounters. Written in a lively and conversational style with minimal technical terminology, and enhanced by actual experience or real clinical situations, this volume lays out a clinical ethics methodology both in practical and theoretical terms. Here's what the experts had to say: Professor Zaner has provided us with a remarkably (...) lucid and trenchant discussion of the interface of philosophy and the field of medicine. He brings into play an extraordinary range of historial knowledge, extensive observations based on firsthand experience with medical practices, and an acute sense of philosophical argumentation. This is a work that will be an exemplary and indispensable text in the philosophy of medicine for years to come. -- Calvin Schrag... it is a highly original contribution usable in a number of fields.... It really has no competition.... The genius of Zaner's approach is to ground ethics from the 'bottom up' and to direct us to the concrete particulars of therapeutic encounters wherein lie moral and ethical matters... meaty, challenging, and ultimately rewarding.... -- Paul R. Dokecki Richard M. Zaner founded the Center for Clinical and Research Ethics at Vanderbilt University Medical Center. Having established Vanderbilt's first Hospital Ethics Committee (1985), he served as co-chair of VUMC's Ethics Committee since its inception in 1990. Zaner has published five original books, edited ten, and translated four more, and has published more than 100 sections of books and professional journals. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:?;5. HUME AND SPINOZA It is strange that there has been so little interest in comparing two great philosophers, Hume and -Spinoza, who were both so important and influential in bringing about the decline of traditional religion. Jessop's bibliography indicates no interest in Hume and Spinoza up to the 1930 's. The Hume conferences of 1976, as far as I have been able to 2 determine, avoided the topic. (...) In one of the better new Hume volumes, Livingston and King, Hume, A Re-evaluation, 3 Spinoza is cited twice, and once incorrectly at that. On the other hand, in the massive new Spinoza volume edited by Siegfried Hessing, Speculum Spinozanun 1677-1977, Hume is mentioned four times, but only one of these has any real relevance to Hume's views vis-a-vis Spinoza's. Some discussion of Hume's comments, usually brief, occurs in the commentators. B. M. Laing, in David Hume, (London 1932), has just three short references to Spinoza. John Laird, in Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature, (London 1932) has a couple of cursory references to Spinoza, plus a bit more extended statement of Pierre Bay le" s critique of him. In H. H. Price, Hume's Theory of the External World, (Oxford 1940), there is one paragraph on Hume and Spinoza. In Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London 1941), there are three references to Spinoza. Rachel Kydd, Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise (Oxford 194 6), has the greatest number of references to Spinoza. She was concerned to compare him with Hume on other matters than are dealt with in this paper, namely Spinoza's theory of reason and 9 the passions. In contrast, André Leroy, David Hume, (Paris 1953), has just one paragraph on Spinoza dealing with the immateriality of the soul; and Ernest C. Mossner, in his monumental Life of David Hume, (Austin 1954), has only one reference to Spinoza - James Beattie's denunciation of Hume, Hobbes, Malebranche, Leibniz and Spinoza. Lastly, in a fairly recent commentary by James Noxon, Spinoza is mentioned 66. three times, but not for anything in Hume's text. Noxon does point out (p. 75) that Spinoza is not mentioned in ] 2 Hume's correspondence. John H. Randall has offered an explanation for this neglect of Spinoza by Hume scholars, namely that "Hume stands for all time as the antithesis of Spinoza in his thought". In the England of Hume's day, Spinoza was little known, but still better known at the time than he was in France or England. Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus 14 had been twice translated into English anonymously. He had been attacked by Bishop Stillingfleet, by John Evelyn, by Berkeley and several others. But Spinoza was not a major figure, except to the English Deists, and to Hume's early patron, the Chevalier Andrew Michael Ramsay. Most of the information known about Spinoza came from Pierre Bayle' s Historical and Critical Dictionary, where the article "Spinoza" is the longest in the Dictionary, about three hundred pages in length. My suspicion, or hypothesis, is that Hume first became interested in Spinoza through Ramsay, and then learned what he knew about Spinoza from Bayle' s article. When the young David Hume went to France to write his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1734, he went first to see the Chevalier Ramsay, who entertained Hume for about two weeks. Ramsay was a leading Scottish Catholic, was the teacher of Bonnie Prince Charlie, a leading Scottish revolutionary, 18 as well as the Grand Master of the Free Masons. With Ramsay's eclectic views it is not odd that he had a serious interest in Spinoza's theory, and that he was composing answers to it. Ramsay advised Hume about his own book, and Hume felt he had to show Ramsay the Treatise before he 19 brought it back to England. In the Treatise there is a not too well studied section on Spinoza, Of the immateriality of the soul 20 (T240-45). In introducing Spinoza into the discussion of 67. the immateriality of the soul, Hume follows what was common practice in his day, namely to insult Spinoza and his theory... (shrink)

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in (...) transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. (shrink)

Tested the 2-process theory of detection, search, and attention presented by the current authors in a series of experiments. The studies demonstrate the qualitative difference between 2 modes of information processing: automatic detection and controlled search; trace the course of the learning of automatic detection, of categories, and of automatic-attention responses; and show the dependence of automatic detection on attending responses and demonstrate how such responses interrupt controlled processing and interfere with the focusing of attention. The learning of categories is (...) shown to improve controlled search performance. A general framework for human information processing is proposed. The framework emphasizes the roles of automatic and controlled processing. The theory is compared to and contrasted with extant models of search and attention. (shrink)

This honest, forthright, and beautifully-written book introduces readers to the human variations on medical topics spoken of in abstract in the daily news--euthanasia, assisted suicide, abortion, "extreme procedures", genetic testing, experimental surgeries--and to the people who must agonize over those decisions regarding themselves and their loved ones.

This article reviews the historical and current controversies about the nature of clinical ethics consultation, as a way to focus on the place and responsibility of ethics consultants within the context of clinical conversation — interpreted as a form of dialogue. These matters are approached through a particularly compelling instance of the controversy that involves several major figures in the field. The analysis serves to highlight very significant questions of the nature and constraints of clinical situations, and the moral responsibility (...) and legal accountability that are especially important for clinical ethics consultants. (shrink)

I agree with Norris et al. that feedback to a phonemic level is never necessary, but disagree strongly with their reason why this is true. I believe the available evidence indicates that there is no feedback because there is no phonemic level employed in the perceptual processing of speech.

The target article suggests that taste is not based on the traditional four basic tastes, but rather is a continuum subserved by cross-fiber integration. This commentary describes evidence indicating that the traditional concept is valid, and that with suitable precautions, it is possible to match natural substances using mixtures representing fundamental tastes.

After writing my response to the commentaries, I sat back and reflected on the fascination and frustration of work on this topic. There is the ancient fascination of trying to understand the nature of the sensory bridge linking us to the external world. Also, discussing the measurability of sensation brings to the surface concepts we use and take for granted when we are working in other areas of psychology; and it holds them before us for critical examination. The frustration lies (...) chiefly in the difficulty of formulating concepts clearly, in a way understood by all. At least when constructing the original Tower of Babel, workers hearing strange words knew that communication was not occurring. The psychophysical Tower of Babel sometimes has workers using the same words, but with different meanings. Much of my response is based on attempts to clarify concepts and clear up confusions. (shrink)

Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.

This paper is devoted to an examination of the discovery, characterization, and analysis of the functions of microRNAs, which also serves as a vehicle for demonstrating the importance of exploratory experimentation in current (post-genomic) molecular biology. The material on microRNAs is important in its own right: it provides important insight into the extreme complexity of regulatory networks involving components made of DNA, RNA, and protein. These networks play a central role in regulating development of multicellular organisms and illustrate the importance (...) of epigenetic as well as genetic systems in evolution and development. The examination of these matters yields principled arguments for the historicity of the functions of key biological molecules and for the indispensability of exploratory experimentation in contemporary molecular biology as well as some insight into the complex interplay between exploratory experimentation and hypothesis-driven science. This latter result is not only important for philosophy of science, but also of practical importance for the evaluation of grant proposals, although the elaboration of this latter claim must be left for another occasion. (shrink)

History of science, it has been argued, has benefited philosophers of science primarily by forcing them into greater contact with "real science." In this paper I argue that additional major benefits arise from the importance of specifically historical considerations within philosophy of science. Loci for specifically historical investigations include: (1) making and evaluating rational reconstructions of particular theories and explanations, (2) estimating the degree of support earned by particular theories and theoretical claims, and (3) evaluating proposed philosophical norms for the (...) evaluation of the degree of support for theories and the worth of explanations. More generally, I argue that theories develop and change structure with time, that (like biological species) they are historical entities. Accordingly, both the identification and the evaluation of theories are essentially historical in character. (shrink)

The measurement of sensory intensity has had a long history, attracting the attention of investigators from many disciplines including physiology, psychology, physics, mathematics, philosophy, and even chemistry. While there has been a continuing doubt by some that sensation has the properties necessary for measurement, experiments designed to obtain estimates of sensory intensity have found that a general rule applies: Equal stimulus ratios produce equal sensory ratios. Theories concerning the basis for this simple psychophysical rule are discussed, with emphasis given to (...) the physical correlate theory, which considers judgments of subjective magnitudes to be based upon estimates of physical dimensions that vary regularly with changes in degree of stimulation. For the most thoroughly investigated sensory scales, brightness and loudness, the physical correlate is considered to be distance. Our “tacit knowledge” of the sensory effects of changing distance plays an essential role in matching motor activities to environmental conditions and in ensuring accurate perceptual evaluations through brightness and loudness constancies. In psychophysical experiments, subjects apparently use this same tacit knowledge when required to estimate relative subjective magnitudes. The evidence related to the physical correlate theory is summarized, and it is concluded that, while under appropriate conditions we demonstrate considerable skill in evaluating environmental relationships, we are quite unable to estimate the neurophysiological nature or quantity of sensory response. A psychophysics devoted to studying conditions required for accuracy and conditions producing errors in the perception of environmental relationships would seem to be more valuable than one devoted to subjective magnitudes. (shrink)

We will give a new cosmological argument for the existence of a being who, although not proved to be the absolutely perfect God of the great Medieval theists, also is capable of playing the role in the lives of working theists of a being that is a suitable object of worship, adoration, love, respect, and obedience. Unlike the absolutely perfect God, the God whose necessary existence is established by our argument will not be shown to essentially have the divine perfections (...) of omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and sovereignty. Furthermore, it is not even shown that he is contingently omnipotent and omniscient, just powerful and intelligent enough to be the supernatural designer-creator of the exceedingly complex and wondrous cosmos that in fact.. (shrink)

In this volume, fourteen scholars, many of them contemporaries of Professor Frank, engage with his legacy with important and seminal works which take some of ...

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phiinomeno logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized, We see straightaway that it can do that only by means of a certain participation in (...) transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen), and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature. l Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. (shrink)

In an overview of the essays in this project, a number of clinical ethics issues receive emphasis. (1) One cluster concerns the ethical concerns presented within the relationship between the providers (doctor, nurse, etc.) and patient (and family), as distinct from those associated with being a clinical ethics consultant invited into a situation to assist. (2) Distinct from these are ethical issues intrinsic to the ways in which clinical encounters are variously written about (from chart notes to published articles). (3) (...) Finally, there is a set of issues connected with the major characteristics of clinical encounters, in view of which it is imperative to be specifically attentive to the fine details and complex interactions among patient, doctor, family, and others, within a specific social context. Keeping these matters in mind helps to clarify the differences between consulting (talking and listening) and writing about consultations, as well as among the various kinds of writing about clinical encounters. (shrink)

In what sense does time exist? Is it an objective feature of the external world? Or is its real nature dependent on the way man experiences it? Has modern science brought us closer to the answer to St. Augustine's exasperated outcry, 'What, then, is time?' ? Ever since Aristotle, thinkers have been struggling with this most confounding and elusive of philosophical questions. How long does the present moment last? Can we make statements about the future that are clearly true or (...) clearly false? And if so, must we be fatalists? This volume presents twenty-three discussions of the problem of time. A section on classical and modern attempts at definition is followed by four groups of essays drawn largely from contemporary philosophy, each preface with an introduction by the editor. First, in a chapter entitled 'The Static versus the Dynamic Temporal', four philosophers advance solutions to McTaggart's famous proof of time's unreality. In the next two sections, the discussion turns to the meaning of the 'open future' and to the much-debated nature of 'human time'. Finally, modern science and philosophy tackle Zeno's celebrated paradoxes. The essays by Adolf Grnbaum, Nicholas Rescher, and William Barrett are published for the first time in this volume. (shrink)